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The increase in the security breach of computer systems and computer networks has led 
to the increase in the number of security tools that seek to protect these assets. Among these tools 
are intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS). IDPS are security systems that are used to 
detect and prevent security threats to computer systems and computer networks. These systems 
are configured to detect and respond to security threats automatically, thereby reducing the risk 
to monitored computers and networks. Intrusion detection and prevention systems use different 
methodologies such as signature based, anomaly based, stateful protocol analysis, and a hybrid 
system that combines some or all of the other systems to detect and respond to security threats. 
Intrusion detection and prevention system comes as an appliance or a software tool. The 
combinations of the methodologies, delivery mechanisms, and the technical requirements for 
properly configuring these systems make it difficult to understand and evaluate these systems. 
This problem is amplified by the lack of publicly available work and current data sets for use in 
evaluating the effectiveness of intrusion detection and prevention systems. This thesis offers a 
solution to this problem in three stages. The first stage will offer a clear explanation of the 
detection methodologies used by the IDPSs and offer a way to compare these methodologies. 
The second stage will focus on setting up test environments for evaluating both hardware and 
software based IDPS using publicly available open source tools Tomahawk and Wireshark. The 
third stage will offer an analysis of the experiments that we conducted using the information 




 Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) have become a valuable tool in 
keeping information systems secure. IDPS are security tools that are used to monitor, analyze, 
and respond to possible security violations against computer and network systems. Although the 
use and dependency of these systems continue to grow, there are no publicly available ways to 
evaluate the effectiveness of these systems. The available commercial tools are expensive and 
are not feasible in some cases.  There is also a lack of current work on this problem and the 
available work and data sets are dated. IDPSs lack an established testing and evaluating 
processes such as those that exists in the software development field.  Unlike the software testing 
field that has a number of proven tools that available for testing, the IDPS users does not have 
the same opportunities or the necessary tools to test the IPDS products once deployed. IDPS 
products also work and behave differently using proprietary rules sets and user interfaces which 
makes it even harder to evaluate them side by side. Most accuracy and performance metrics on 
IDPS products tend to be available without the raw data on how the results were produced. Also 
these numbers are based on lab environments which are not identical to the production 
environment where the IDPS product will protect. Although these test results are accurate, our 
research found that most production environments are not identical and that security priorities 
vary from one organization to the other.  We also discovered that a considerable amount of 
resources are required to properly deploy, run, and maintain an IDPS.  IDPS products also use 
different proprietary detection engines which makes it difficult to evaluate and understand their 
underlining methodologies. Most of the research work on this issue tends to focus on improving 
one methodology or evaluating one methodology against a proposed new one.   
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The objective of this thesis is not to improve any of the IDPS methodologies or propose a 
new methodology, instead it is to clear the misunderstandings about evaluating IDPS 
effectiveness by offering a simple but effective way to understand and evaluate IDPS 
methodologies and products. These problems are broken into three phases:  
1. The first phase offers a detailed overview of the four commonly used IDPS 
methodologies and a simple way to evaluate these methodologies.  
2. The second phase explains four ways to setup test environments for evaluating IDPS 
products using open source utilities and some publicly available evaluation copies of 
commercial tools. Using the evaluation parameters established during the first phase.  
3. During the third phase we will use an advanced setup to run experiments using four 
IDPS products, our evaluation parameters, and then analyze the results. 
The results from our test IDPS products will be evaluated and interpreted as a whole system for 
example, the performance and overhead are looked at closely since they are interdependent. We 
also combined easy to use and configuration to gauge how difficult it is to setup, use and manage 
an IDPS.  These are the most important evaluation parameters and in we found that the IDPS 
products  that require less resources to configure and use had a  favorable recommendation and  






2.1 IDPS Detection Methodologies 
This chapter offers a brief overview of other research work on IDPS methodologies and 
the evaluations of the IDPS products. 
2.1.1 Anomaly based methodology. Intrusion detection and prevention systems are a 
combination of intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention systems. Intrusion 
prevention came out of research on the short comings of intrusion detection. Intrusion detection 
evolved out of a report that proposed a threat model [9]. This report laid down the foundation of 
intrusion detection systems by presenting a model for identifying abnormal behavior in computer 
systems. This model broke down threats into three groups, external penetrations, internal 
penetrations, and misuse. The report used these three groups of threats to develop an anomaly 
based user behavior monitoring system.  In 1987, “a model for a real-time intrusion-detection 
expert system that aims to detect a wide range of security violations ranging from attempted 
break-ins by outsiders to system penetrations and abuses by insiders” was proposed [10].  This 
model was based on the idea that security breaches to any system can be identified and 
monitored by analyzing the system’s audit logs. The model was comprised of profiles, metrics, 
statistical models, and rules for analyzing the logs. This model provide “a framework for a 
general-purpose intrusion-detection system expert system” that is still in use today [11]. 
Anomaly detection methodologies are plagued with high rates of false positives and a new 
detection system for anomaly based methodology that strikes a balance between generalizations 
is proposed [21]. The proposed system balances the generalizations in anomaly detection 
methodologies and in doing so it achieves both a high accuracy rate and a low false positive rate. 
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In [25] data mining techniques that are used in anomaly based intrusion detection are explored. A 
further discussion of the statistical based anomaly methodology is covered in [26].  
2.1.2 Signature based methodology. In [17] a structured approach to intrusion detection 
systems by defining and classifying the components of an IDS system is offered. This 
classification offered a clear understanding of all the parts that make up intrusion detection 
systems and the challenges the systems faces.  James and Jay offered survey of where the current 
research is on the techniques and methodologies used in intrusion detection [18]. Their focus was 
to summarize the research done in intrusion detection to this point and in so doing offered a 
starting point for future research to start. A technical overview of intrusion detection systems 
starting with the fundamentals of how these systems are structured to the techniques they use to 
detect and identify potential security threats are discussed in [19]. This paper also explains how 
an intrusion detection system responds to violations of the security policies they are monitoring. 
In a proposal for a new signature based intrusion detection and prevention system [23], the 
authors started by presenting the basic organization and implementations of intrusion detection 
and prevention systems.  Then they went on to proposed and design a new signature based 
intrusion detection and prevention system called HawkEye. The authors also compared it with 
current intrusion detection and prevention systems on the market. In [27] Snort, the most popular 
signature based IDS is discussed. 
2.1.3 Stateful protocol analysis based methodology.  Intrusion detection and prevention 
systems suffer from scalable and efficiency problems, these two problems are addressed by high 
performance deep packet pre-filtering and memory efficient technique [20]. This technique 
allows the Intrusion detection and prevention systems to have high accuracy rates and high 
performance numbers by utilizing a deep packet pre-filter and changing how it handles and 
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processes memory and captured data. In [31] a network based intrusion detection system that is 
based on dynamic application layer protocol analysis. Protocol analysis is detailed in [32], which 
combines it with another methodology. In [33] stateful protocol analysis is used as the based for 
a proposed Web IDS. A new detection engine that is based on understanding the protocols is 
proposed in [51] 
2.1.4 Hybrid based methodology. Combining the two most used methodologies in 
intrusion detection and prevention systems into a system that uses both anomaly and signature 
based detection methodologies produces a better detection system [22]. This combination of 
methodologies produces a better system by preprocessing the data with the anomaly detection 
engine and then passing the results to the signature based engine. This results in a very high 
accuracy rate and very low false positives. The two main methodologies used in intrusion 
detection and prevention systems are combined to form a collaborative intelligent intrusion 
detection system (CIIDS) [16]. This work looked and addressed current challenges to 
collaborative intrusion detection systems and the algorithms they employ for alert correlation. It 
also suggested ways to reduce false positives while improving the detection accuracy. Fuzzy 
logic and data mining is combined in [28] to produce a hybrid methodology that combines 
anomaly and signature methodologies. In [29] another combination of anomaly and signature 
based methodologies is covered. In [30] a new hybrid intrusion detection system is proposed for 
clustered wireless sensor networks. A new hybrid system for mobile adhoc networks is proposed 
in [52] and this system combines anomaly and the new system that is based on how the system 
responds to an attack. 
2.2 IDPS Evaluations 
The first research that looked the claims of the intrusion detection systems appeared in 
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 1998. This work put forth a frame work for thoroughly testing an intrusion detection system and 
also offers data sets to be used in the evaluations. This early work is evaluated and checked for 
accuracy in [34. This work challenges the continual use of the data sets produced in IDPS tests. 
This work puts on argument that these data sets are out dated and that the procedures used to 
generate the data sets were not representative of a production network [35]. Another evaluation 
was conducted that looked at the accuracy of the data sets [36]. A study of the advantages and 
disadvantages of intrusion detection systems (IDS) performance tests were studied and the 
resulting work produced a frame work for evaluating IDSs [37]. These limitations in the 
evaluation of IDPSs were addressed by the Lincoln Adaptable Real time Information Assurance 
Test bed (LARIAT) [37]. This was a better testing application that used a graphical user interface 
instead of the command line and was easier to use but was only available to the United States 
government [37]. Trident evaluation was another work that tried to improve on the early works 
by introducing ways to add new background and attack traffic to the test data sets [38. This work 
offered a way to account for evasion techniques during an evaluation of an IDPS. A comparison 
of two IDPS methodologies to evaluate them is given in [39]. This work describes how to set up 
a test bed that can be used to evaluate an IDPS using a Snort and Spade. Network captured 
packets that are used for evaluating an IDPS have to be clean and complete. Cleaning these files 
and making them suitable for use in IDPS testing is presented in [45]. Before an IDPS is 
evaluated for effectiveness, its underlying detection methodologies need to be understood. An 
IDPS can be based on any of the four main detection methodologies. The signature based, 
anomaly based, stateful protocol analysis based, and the hybrid based detection methodologies 
are described in [46]. In [49] the effects of regular network traffic on how an IDPS are examined.  
The first research that looked the claims of the intrusion detection systems appeared in the  
9 





















Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems Detection Methodologies 
3.1 Introduction 
     Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are security tools that are used to monitor and analyze 
computer and network systems for possible security violations. These violations can be a result 
of break-in attempts by unauthorized external intruders trying to compromise the system or 
internal privileged users misusing their authority.  Intrusion detection systems tend to be passive 
and only monitor and notifies the administrator of possible threats to monitored systems. 
Intrusion prevention system (IPS) is an intrusion detection system that has the capacity to 
prevent intrusions [1, 2]. Both the Intrusion detection system and the Intrusion prevention system 
can be a software tool or an appliance. The intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) is a 
combination of the intrusion detection and the intrusion prevention systems. All of these systems 
use the same underlining methodologies to detect and analyze intrusions.  The main detection 
methodologies are signature based, anomaly based, Stateful protocol analysis based, and hybrid 
based. Figure 1.1 shows a general purpose architecture of which IDPS systems are based. This 
architecture was developed by the Intrusion Detection Working Group and has four functional 
blocks, the Event blocks which are the event boxes that gathers events from the monitored 
system and will be analyzed by other blocks, then the Database blocks which are the database 
boxes which stores the events from the Event blocks, then the Analysis blocks that processes the 
events and sends an alert, and final the Response blocks whose purpose is to respond to an 
intrusion and stop it [3]. The signature based methodology is also referred to as misuse based or 
rule based [3]. The signature based system works by comparing observed traffic and application 











Figure 1.1. General architecture for IDPS systems. 
 The signature based system is fast and highly effective on known violations or threats, but does 
not work so well on new threats or variants of known threat. The anomaly based systems works 
by learning the monitored system of which it builds a baseline profile which it uses as a template 
and compare against observed activities and any diversions are marked as an anomaly [5]. 
Anomaly based systems places the most overhead on the systems it is monitoring.  Its advantage 
is that it can detect new threats without any new updates. Stateful protocol analysis methodology 
works by comparing established profiles of how protocols should behave against the observed 
behavior. A hybrid methodology works by combining two or more of the other methodologies.  
All these methodologies are plagued with false positive and false negatives and the anomaly 
based methodology IDPS produces the most.  False positives are when non-security threats are 
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flagged as threats and false negative result when actual security threats are flagged as non-
security threats.  Some current IDPS products on the market use a hybrid of these methodologies 
in an effort to be more accurate and reduce the number of false positives and negatives. One way 
to reduce false positive and false negative is to use alert correlation. Most of the research work 
done on intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) mainly focuses on defining and 
detailing one methodology or  technology or suggesting a new methodology or technology but 
stops short of offering a guideline or techniques for comparing all established methodologies, 
technologies, and systems that use these methodologies. In this thesis, we offer a clear 
presentation of intrusion detection and prevention systems, starting by defining the four mainly 
used methodologies, the signature based, anomaly based, stateful protocol analysis based, hybrid 
based and then offer a way to compare and test IDPS systems and their underlining 
methodologies. Then conclude by offering a list of current popular IDPS products on the market. 
3.2 IDPS Methodologies 
There are many different methodologies used by IDPS to detect changes on the systems 
they monitor. These changes can be external attacks or misuse by internal personnel. Here, we 
describe the four methodologies in detail. As shown in Figure 1.2, all the methodologies use the 
same general model and the differences among them is mainly on how they process information 
gathered from the monitored environment to determine if a violation of the set policy has 
occurred. 
3.2.1 Anomaly based methodology. Anomaly based methodology works by comparing 
observed activity against a baseline profile. The baseline profile is the learned normal behavior 
of the monitored system and is developed during the learning period were the IDPS learns the 
13 
environment and develops a normal profile of the monitored system. This environment can be 
















Figure 1.2. Organization of a generalized intrusion detection and prevention system [14]. 
The profile can be fixed or dynamic. A fixed profile does not change once established while a 
dynamic profile changes as the systems been monitored evolves [8]. A dynamic profile adds 
extra over head to the system as the IDPS continues to update the profile which also opens it to 
evasion. An attacker can evade the IDPS that uses a dynamic profile by spreading the attack over 
a long time period. In doing so, her attack becomes part of the profile as the IDPS incorporates 
her changes into the profile as normal system changes. Once the baseline profile is developed 
and current profile is also created and compared to the baseline profile. Using a predefined 
threshold any deviations that fall outside the threshold are reported as violations. A new dynamic 
anomaly detection technique is proposed that uses hidden Markov model for modeling the 
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normal behavior of program through analyzing system calls [24]. The proposed technique uses a 
two layer detection scheme to reduce false positives and improve detection rates. A fixed profile 
is very effective at detecting new attacks since any change from normal behavior is classified as 
an anomaly.   
Anomaly based methodologies can detect zero-day attacks to environment without any updates 
to the system. Anomaly intrusion detection methodology uses three general techniques for 
detecting anomalies and these are the statistical anomaly detection, Knowledge/data-mining, and 
machine learning based [8].  
The statistical anomaly techniques are used to build the two required profiles, one during 
the learning phase which is then used as the baseline profile and the current profile which is 
compared to the baseline profile and any differences that found a  marked as anomalies 
depending on the threshold settings of the monitored environment [1]. Environments that use 
high thresholds have a higher rate of false positives and those that uses lower threshold might 
experience a high rate of false negatives.  The threshold must be tuned according to the 
requirements and behavior of the environment being monitored for the systems to be effective.  
The knowledge/data-mining technique is used to automate the way the technique monitor 
searches for anomalies and this process places a very high overheard on the system. The 
technique produces the most false positives and false negatives are produced due to the high 
overhead that   result from the complicated task of identifying and correctly categorizing  
observed events on the system [4]. The machine learning technique works by analyzing the 
system calls and it is the widely used technique [7, 14]. The general architecture of an anomaly 
based IDPS system is shown in Figure 1.3. This architecture is utilized by all techniques that use 
the anomaly based methodology. As shown in Figure 1.3, the monitored environment is 
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monitored by the detector that examines the observed events against the baseline profile. If the 
observed events match the baseline, no action is taken, but if it does not match the baseline 













Figure 1.3. Anomaly based methodology architecture. 
If the observed events do not match the baseline profile and fall outside the threshold range they 
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are marked as an anomaly and an alert is issued. 
The anomaly based methodologies have the following advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages 
 The ability to detect new attacks/violations without updates. 
 Detects insider attacks 
 Detects variants of know attacks 
 Does not need signature updates to detect new threats 
 Can detect threats that utilize multiple but separate attacks 
Disadvantages 
 High volume of false positives and false negatives 
 Needs a training period before use 
 Places high overhead on the system 
 Difficult to use due to high volume of alerts 
3.2.2 Signature based methodology. Signature based methodology works by comparing 
observed signatures to the signatures on file. This file can be database or a list of known attack 
signatures. Any signature observed on the monitored environment that matches the signatures on 
file is flagged as a violation of the security policy or as an attack. The signature based IDPS has 
little overhead since it does not inspect every activity or network traffic on the monitored 
environment. Instead it only searches for known signatures in the database or file. Unlike the 
anomaly based methodology, the signature based methodology system is easy to deploy since it 
does not need to learn the environment [4]. This methodology works by simply searching, 
inspecting, and comparing the contents of captured network packets for known threats 
signatures. It also compares behavior signatures against allowed behavior signatures. The general 
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architecture of a signature based methodology is shown in Figure 1.4. This architecture uses the 
detector to find and compare activity signatures found in the monitored environment to the 
known signatures in the signature database. If a match is found, an alert is issued and there is no 












Figure 1.4. Signature based methodology architecture.   
Signature based methodology also analyzes the systems calls for known threats payload [7]. 
Signature based methodology is very effective against know attacks/violations but it cannot 
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detect new attacks until it is updated with new signatures. Signature based IDPS are easy to 
evade since they are based on known attacks and are depended on new signatures to be applied 
before they can detect new attacks [15]. Signature based detection systems can be easily 
bypassed by attackers who modify known attacks and target systems that have not been updated 
with new signatures that detect the modification. Signature based methodology requires 
significant resources to keep up with the potential infinite number of modifications to known 
threats. Signature based methodology is simpler to modify and improve since its performance is 
mainly based on the signatures or rules deployed [19]. 
The Signature based methodologies have the following advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages 
 Has no learning/training period 
 Very efficient at detecting known threats 
 Low volume of false positives  
 Less overhead on the system being monitored 
Disadvantages 
 Needs signature update to detect new threats 
 Cannot detect variants of know attacks 
 Cannot detect insider attacks 
 Leaves the monitored environment at risk during the time when a new threat is 
discovered and the time a signature is applied. 
3.2.3 Stateful protocol analysis based methodology. The Stateful protocol analysis 
methodology works by comparing established profiles of how protocols should behave against 
the observed behavior. The established protocol profiles are designed and established by 
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vendors. Unlike the signature based methodology which only compares observed behavior 
against a list, Stateful protocol analysis explores in detail how the protocols and applications 
should interact/work. This deep understanding/analysis places a very high overhead on the 
systems [30]. Stateful protocol analysis blends and compliments other IDPS methodologies well 
which has led to rise of hybrid methodologies [32]. Stateful protocol analysis’s deep 
understanding of how protocol should behave is used as a base for developing IDPS that 
understand web traffic behavior and are effective at protecting websites [33].  Although the 
Stateful protocol analysis has a deep understanding of the monitored protocols, it can be easily 
evaded by attacks that follow and stay within the acceptable behavior of protocols. Stateful 
protocol analysis methodologies and techniques have slowly been adapted and integrated into 
other methodologies over the past decade. This has led to the decline of IDPS that utilize just 
Stateful protocol analysis methodology. The majority of the research on IDPS methodologies 
mainly concentrates on anomaly, signature, and hybrid methodologies which further reduce the 
viability of Stateful protocol analysis as a standalone IDPS methodology. 
The general architecture of Stateful protocol analysis is shown in Figure 1.5. This architecture is 
identical to that of the signature based methodology with one exception, instead of the signature 
database the Stateful protocol analysis has database of acceptable protocol behavior.  
The Stateful protocol analysis methodologies have the following advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages 
 Has no learning/training period 
 Very efficient at detecting known threats 
 Low volume of false positives  















Figure 1.5. Stateful protocol analysis based methodology architecture. 
 Resists evasion 
Disadvantages 
 Needs signature/rule update to detect new threats 
 Cannot detect variants of know attacks 
 Cannot detect insider attacks 
 Can place high overhead on the processing system 
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 Leaves the monitored environment at risk during the time when a new threat is   
discovered and the time a signature/rule is applied 
3.2.4 Hybrid based methodology. The hybrid based methodology works by combining 
two or more of the other methodologies. The result is a better methodology that takes advantage 
of the strengths of the combined methodologies. Prelude is one of the first hybrid IDS that 
offered a framework based on the Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) an 
IETF standard that allows different sensors to communicate[26].  In [27], Snort is modified by 
adding an anomaly based engine to its signature based engine to create a better detection and 
then the new hybrid systems is tested against the regular Snort using same test data. The hybrid 
system detected more intrusions than the regular one. A hybrid intrusion detection system of 
cluster-based wireless sensors networks was proposed that worked by breaking the detection into 
two, first it used anomaly based model to filter the data and then it used signature based model to 
detect intrusion attempts. Another model for a hybrid methodology was proposed based on how 
the human immune system works [28]. The proposed system is “based on the framework of the 
human immune system, that uses a hybrid architecture which applies both anomaly and misuse 
detection approaches” [7].  A general over view of a hybrid system is shown in Figure 1.6 where 
three popular methodologies are combined to produce a better system that capitalizes on the 
strengths of the combined methodologies. The monitored environment is analyzed by the first 
methodology which sanitizes the monitored environment and then sanitized passed environment 
is then analyzed by the second methodology which repeats the sanitizing process. After the 
second sanitizing, the final methodology is engaged to performs the final cleanse. This produces 
a better system.  












Figure 1.6. Hybrid based methodology architecture.   
Advantages 
 Has a shorter or no learning/training period 
 Very efficient at detecting both known and unknown threats 
 Can detect variants of know attacks 
 Low volume of false positives  
 Accurate alerts 
 Can detect insider attacks 
 May protect the monitored environment during the time when a new threat is 
discovered and the time when a signature/rule is applied 
Disadvantages 
 Needs signature/rule update to detect new threats 
 Cannot detect variants of know attacks 
 Cannot detect insider attacks 
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 May leave the monitored environment at risk during the time when a new threat is 
discovered and the time when a signature/rule is applied.  
3.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of IDPS Detection Methodologies Features 
The four main methodologies have advantages and disadvantages over one another. The 
current systems are combining these methodologies in effort to have intrusion detection and 
prevention system takes advantage of the advantages of each methodology while reducing the 
short comings of each methodology. This section details the advantages and disadvantages of 
each methodology. After going through research papers, commercial products, we selected the 
following parameters to compare the four methodologies. The advantages and drawbacks of the 
four main intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) methodologies are described below 
and shown in Table 1.1. 
3.3.1 Detects new attacks. This is the ability of a methodology to automatically detect 
new attacks to the protected environment. This should happen without any changes or updates to 
the monitoring system. A system that uses the anomaly or the hybrid based methodologies can 
detect new attacks without any updates, while the signature based and the Stateful protocol 
analysis based systems needs their signatures or rules to be modified and updated with new 
attacks signatures. 
3.3.2. Detects insider attacks. Insider attacks happen when trusted personal who have 
access and knowledge of the intrusion detection and prevention system takes advantage of their 
access and knowledge and use it to bypass and attack the system. Only systems that employ the 
anomaly methodologies can detect the diversion from the normal behavior of a user and alert on 
it. Other methodologies cannot detect this change in behavior as they are only looking for known 
signatures or behavior.  
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3.3.3 Detects attacks from day one of installation. This is the ability of an IDPS to 
work from the moment of initial installation without needing a period of time for the 
methodology to learn the environment and create profiles. The signature and the Stateful 
protocol analysis based methodologies have the advantage here when compared to the anomaly 
based methodology. The hybrid based methodology can have an advantage depending on the 
characteristics of the combined methodologies. 
3.3.4 Detects all known attacks. This is the ability of the methodology to successfully 
detect all know threat attempts. This is an area were the signature and the Stateful protocol 
analysis based IDPS has an advantage over the anomaly based systems. The hybrid based 
methodology can have an advantage or disadvantage based on the methodologies that are 
combined. 
3.3.5 Detects variants of known attacks. This is the capacity of the methodology to 
recognize any modifications and variants of all known attacks. The anomaly based 
methodologies have the advantage over other methodologies due to the way the anomaly works. 
Signature and Stateful protocol analysis based methodologies cannot detect any changes to know 
attacks without first updating their signatures or rules. The hybrid based methodologies can have 
an advantage if one of their combined methodologies is anomaly based. 
3.3.6 Training period. A training period is the amount of time required by an IDPS 
methodology after installation to learn the monitored environment and build its profiles. These 
profiles are then used by the methodology as a base. This is a disadvantage for the anomaly 
based methodology as it prevents it from working from day one of installation. This can also be a 
disadvantage for the hybrid methodology based if anomaly based methodology is one of the 
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combined methodologies, but the disadvantage is not as high as for the anomaly based 
methodology. 
3.3.7 Easy to understand alerts. An IDPS methodology has to produce threat alerts that 
are easy to understand. The anomaly based methodology is plagued with a very high number of 
alerts due to the way it works and this makes it difficult to interpret and understand all the alerts 
it produces. The signature based and Stateful protocol analysis based methodologies tend to 
generate few and more specific alerts which gives them an advantage over the anomaly based 
and hybrid based methodologies.  
Table 1.1 
 Advantages and disadvantages of intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) 
methodologies 
Advantage(Yes)/Disadvantage(No) Hybrid Anomaly Signature Stateful Protocol 
Analysis 
Detects new attacks Yes Yes No No 
Detects insider attacks Yes Yes No No 
Detects attacks from day one of 
installation 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Detects all known attacks Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Detects variants of known attacks Yes Yes No No 
Training Period No Yes No No 
Easy to understand alerts Yes No Yes Yes 
Needs signature or rule updates Yes No Yes Yes 
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Depending on which methodologies a hybrid methodology combines, a hybrid system can 
produce better alerts than the single methodologies. 
3.3.8 Needs signature/rule updates. This is a measure of how an IDPS methodology 
stays current. It requires constant signature or rule updates or it continuously update itself. The 
anomaly based methodologies has the advantage over others as it monitors the environment and 
updates its profiles by itself. While the signature and the Stateful protocol analysis based 
methodologies require constant signature or rule updates. The hybrid based methodologies have 
a slight advantage over the signature and Stateful protocol analysis based methodologies. The 
hybrid advantage is depended on the combined methodologies. 
3.4 Evaluations of IDPS Detection Methodologies 
This section offers a description of ways for evaluating intrusion detection and prevention 
system (IDPS) methodologies and the systems that are based on these methodologies. Table 1.2 
can be used to evaluate any intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) whether it uses one 
of the three main methodologies or a combination of the two or more of the other methodologies.  
3.4.1 Resistance to evasion. The intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) 
should be able to detect evasion attempts and stop them. These attempts are more common with 
the signature and stateful protocol analysis based intrusion detection and prevention system 
(IDPS) due their dependence on signatures. Anomaly based intrusion detection and prevention 
system (IDPS) have better resistance to evasion, but the hybrid based system offers the best 
resistance to evasion attempts due to the combination of other methodologies.  
3.4.2 High accuracy rate. An IDPS should have a high accuracy rate when detecting and 
analyzing possible threats. The signature based methodology has a high accuracy rate on known 
threats but its overall rate is lower than the anomaly based methodology which can detect threats  
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which can detect previously unknown threats. The hybrid based methodology offers the best 
accuracy rates. 
3.4.3 Market share. Market share is the measure of the methodology’s dominance in the 
deployed systems. The signature based methodology far outweighs the other three 
methodologies, followed by Stateful protocol analysis. The anomaly and hybrid based 
methodology are the bottom but their adaption is growing much faster and will soon surpass the 
first two methodologies. 
3.4.4 Scalability. Scalability is the ability of an IDPS to scale and grow with 
environment once deployed. The signature and Stateful protocol analysis based methodologies 
are easy to scale since they are based on signatures that can be easily scaled. A hybrid based 
methodology can be easily scale depending on the underlying methodologies. The anomaly 
based methodology is the least scalable methodology due the time it requires to learn and build 
its baseline profiles. 
3.4.5 Maturity level. Maturity level looks at how long a methodology has been around 
and how stable it is. The signature based methodology is the most mature, followed by the 
Stateful protocol analysis and anomaly based methodologies. The hybrid methodology is at the 
bottom of this list, but it is growing at a much faster than the others.  
3.4.6 Overhead on monitored system. The intrusion detection and prevention system 
(IDPS) should not place a lot of overhead on the monitored systems; it should work without 
affecting the performance of monitored systems. Signature and Stateful protocol analysis places 
the least overhead on the monitored systems. The hybrid based methodology can place a high 
overhead burden on the monitored system depending on the combined methodologies. The 
anomaly based methodology places the most overhead on the monitored system. 
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3.4.7 Maintenance. The anomaly based methodology requires the least amount of 
maintenance since it does not require updates to detect new threats. The other three 
methodologies require constant signature updates in order to keep up with new threats. This 
constant updating of signatures adds to the resources required to maintain the methodology. 
3.4.8 Performance. The intrusion detection and prevention system should be able to 
perform at peak performance under all condition on the monitored system without becoming a 
bottle neck or reducing its efficiency. The signature and Stateful protocol analysis based 
methodologies offers better performance than anomaly and hybrid based methodologies since 
they only check for well-defined signatures which do not require as much resources. 
3.4.9 Easy to configure. The intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) should be 
easy to install and integrate with other security tools already in the environment. The signature 
and the Stateful protocol analysis methodologies are easier to install and configure. They do not 
require as much time to tune since they use signatures that can be updated automatically in some 
cases. The anomaly and the hybrid depending on the combined methodologies require more time 
to configure, learn, and tune the environment.  
3.4.10 Easy to use.  The intrusion detection and prevention system should be easy to use 
and understand. This means it produces less false positives and false negatives which makes it 
easier to analyze and understand the alerts. The signature and the Stateful protocol analysis 
methodologies are easier to use since they produce fewer alerts. The hybrid based methodology 
can be easier than the anomaly depending on its underlying methodologies. The anomaly 
requires more resources to manage the high volumes of alerts it produces. 
3.4.11 Protection against new attacks. The intrusion detection and prevention system 
should be able to detect new threats. The anomaly based methodology does detect new attacks  
29 
Table 1.2  
Parameters for evaluating IDPS methodologies. 
 Anomaly Signature Stateful Protocol 
Analysis 
Hybrid 
Resistance to Evasion Medium Low Low High 
High accuracy rate Medium Medium Medium High 
Market Share Medium High Medium Medium 
Scalability Medium High High Medium 
Maturity Level High High High Medium 
Overhead on Monitored 
System 
Medium Low Low Medium 
Maintenance Low Medium Medium Medium 
Performance Medium High High Medium 
Easy to Configure No Yes Yes No 
Easy to Use Medium Low Low Low 
Protection against New 
Attacks 
High Low Medium High 
False Positives High Low Low Low 
False Negatives High Medium Medium Low 
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without any updates unlike the signature and Stateful protocol analysis that require their 
signatures to be updated before they can detect previously unknown threats. The hybrid based 
methodology can detect new threats if one of the underlying methodologies is anomaly based. 
3.4.12 False positives. False positives happen as a result of a methodology 
misclassifying a non-threat event as a threat. The anomaly based methodology is plagued by  
false positives. The signature and Stateful protocol analysis based methodologies produces the 
least number of false positives. The hybrid based methodology’s level of false positives is low if 
anomaly based is not part of its underlying methodologies. 
3.4.13 False negatives. False negatives are a result on a methodology classifying threats 
as non-threats.  The anomaly based methodology produces the most false negatives when 
compared with signature and the Stateful protocol analysis based methodologies. The hybrid 
based methodology produces less false negatives if it does not use anomaly based methodology 














Setting Up IDPS Testing Environment Using Tomahawk  and Wireshark 
4.1 Introduction to Tomahawk and Wireshark 
Tomahawk and Wireshark are open source tools that we used to create and manipulate 
the files during our evaluations. 
4.1.1 Tomahawk. Tomahawk is an open source network tool that can be used to generate 
background network traffic, replay network traffic, and manipulate network traffic using 
captured network traffic files. The captured traffic can then be replayed during the evaluation of 
an IDPS.  For the evaluation to be effective the traffic capture should come from the 
environment where the IDPS will reside.  This produces a more accurate test. Once the traffic is 
captured, it can be replayed in controlled environment where   more experimentation can be done 
without negatively affecting the production environment. Before the capturing is started care 
should be taken to guarantee that all session information was also capture [41]. A simply way to 
make sure that all session related information is captured is to start Wireshark and the recording 
before the attacks are launched.  Within the controlled environment the captured traffic can be 
used as background traffic while exploits are introduced to the monitored workstation/server. 
4.1.2 Wireshark. Wireshark is open source network utility that available at no cost form 
it web site. It is mainly used for analyzing network packets and network troubleshooting [43]. 
Wireshark has other uses such as capturing network traffic and saving in a number of formats. 
We selected it Wireshark for use in capturing and saving attacks in our test environment. Among 
the reasons we selected Wireshark is that it has a very small foot print and it runs on Windows 
and has nice graphical user interface when compared to other utilities that can capture and save 
network traffic. Wireshark is also very stable and has big user base and it is well document and 
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for our purposes we just click the start and stop recording buttons and then save the output in a 
format we want. 
The following are the hardware and software requirements for using Tomahawk to 
evaluate an IDPS. 
4.2 Hardware and Software Requirements 
• Workstation or server with a minimum of two network cards (running Linux/Unix flavor 
operating system) 
• Second workstation or server with a minimum of two network cards  
• Captured network traffic file in the libpcap format (cleaned) 
• Network traffic capture tool (Wireshark) 
• A minimum of a 2.0 GHz Pentium equivalent processor 
• A minimum of 1GB of ram (2 or more is recommended) 
• Network switch (optional) 
• Management pc (optional) 
• Third network card on the other workstation/server (optional) 
• Network cables (crossover optional) 
4.3 Hardware Setup 
There are three ways of configuring the hardware for testing an IPDS using Tomahawk. 
A basic way with just two computers with a minimum of two network cards each, a medium 
setup which is a basic setup with a hardware IDPS, and an advanced way which is a medium 
setup with an addition of a network switch and a management computer. These setups do not 
include an internet connection as a way to control the network traffic during the evaluation of an                              
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IDPS using tomahawk. If desired an internet connection can be added to either the attacker or the 
attacked computer. 
4.4 Basic Setup 
A basic setup is the simple way to test a software based IDPS. As shown in Figure 2.1, 
only two machines with two network cards and two crossed-over network cables are required. 
One of the machines is configured as the attack machine and Tomahawk is installed on it. The 
other machine is configured as the attacked machine and the software based IDPS is installed on 
it. The two machines are connected to one another with the crossover cables. Tomahawk only 
runs on Unix or Linux based operating systems and as a result the attack machine will require a 






 Figure 2.1.  Basic Setup  
4.5 Medium Setup 
The medium setup is also simple but adds a hardware/appliance based IDPS. It requires 
two machines with two network cards each and three network cables. The machines are 
connected through the IDPS as shown in Figure 2.2. In this setup the IPDS saves as a network 
switch connecting the two computers. The computer that tomahawk will be installed on has to 
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have a Linux or Unix based operating systems. Also the computer that has tomahawk running on 
it must have two network cards that will be used by tomahawk. The other computer that serves as 









Figure 2.2.  Medium Setup. 
4.6 Advanced Setup 
The advanced setup is more involved than the other two as it adds a third network card, a 
switch, five network cables, a management machine, and the internet. The machines are 
connected through the switch and the IDPS as shown in Figure 2.3. One of the machines with 
three network cards is configured as the attack machine and Tomahawk is installed on it. The 
other machine is configured as the attacked machine and sets on behind the IDPS and a third 
management machine is connected to the switch. This the ideal setup for testing IDPSs as it 
allows for different configuration changes to be made. For example, more computers can be 
added to the test by adding another switch between the IDPS and the attacked computers or by 
adding more computers on both sides. This would allow for evaluating the IDPS behavior under 












Figure 2.3.  Advanced Setup. 
4.7 Advantages of Using Tomahawk 
Tomahawk was chosen for this setup due to the advantages it offers over other tools that 
replays captured network packets. Tomahawk uses simple commands and flags that can be 
teamed together to easily manipulate the traffic going to the attacked computer. It can take a 
small packet and manipulate it to produce the desired traffic flow.   
Some advantages of using tomahawk include: 
• Tomahawk is free and publicly available 
• It is simple to use 
• It is very stable and mature 
• Does not require a lot of resources to run it 
• Can evaluate both software and hardware based IDPS  
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4.8 PCAP File 
A PCAP file is a file that contains captured network activity and saved in the libpcap 
format with a PCAP extension. This format and extension allow the file to be used by multiple 
network related tools on most current operating systems. Tomahawk works by replaying and 
manipulating PCAP files. Tomahawk does not create its own PCAP files but they can be created 
by network monitoring tools such as Wireshark. Wireshark is an open source network 
monitoring tool that has multiple functions and it runs on most current operating systems. PCAP 
files can also be downloaded from the Internet from trusted sources. There are advantages to 
creating your own PCAP file for use with Tomahawk. Using own PCAP files allows to use 
traffic that is representative of the environment where the IDPS will reside and protect. It also 
allows the capture of traffic at different times and different load situations. This facilitates 
different mixes of traffic volumes and applications on the network.  Using a downloaded PCAP 
may not present a true picture of the environment being tested which can led to a wrong IDPS 
been chosen. 
4.9 Testing Methodology 
Tomahawk can be configured and used in variety ways to support different test 
configurations. The three setups described above are examples of setting up three different test 
environments for evaluating an IDPS using Tomahawk. Tomahawk works the same way 
regardless of the configuration of the setup and it supports both software and hardware based 
IDPS. Tomahawk works by replaying captured network packets that are saved as a PCAP file in 
a bi-direction fashion and breaking the PCAP file into two pieces and then assigns these pieces to 
the client and the other to the server [44]. Using this system allows Tomahawk to keep track of 
the PCAP file as it is replayed. By breaking the PCAP file into packets allows Tomahawk to 
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assign the first IP address it encounters in the PCAP file to the client and the second IP address 
to the server. This process is repeated until the whole PCAP file is replayed entirely. Once the 
PCAP file is broken down into packets and the client and server IP addresses are assigned, 
tomahawk starts replaying the packets. The client packets are sent out on eth0 and the server 
packets are send out on eth1. Tomahawk has a default of 0.2 seconds for re-transmissions of lost 
packets and it also auto manages other network related tasks such as MAC addresses, client and 
server IP address. If the IDPS detects and blocks the PCAP file that contains an attack, 
tomahawk will report a time out. If tomahawk reports that the PCAP containing an attack 
completed without any errors, then the IDPS will have missed the attack [44]. 
4.10 Creating PCAP Files 
We use Wireshark to capture and create four PCAP files that we use in our test 
environment. Creating PCAP files with Wireshark is documented in [43]. The PCAP files we use 
were created using default settings in Wireshark. After starting Wireshark, we recorded the 
network traffic and then initiated the attacks/exploits that way we capture all the packets related 
to the attack. The following PCAP files were created: 
4.10.1 PCAP1. This is a simple file that contained normal network traffic and no attack 
traffic. This file is a capture of traffic browsing a server. This capture will be used to test how the 
IDPS handles normal traffic and establish some baselines.  
4.10.2 PCAP2. This file is a capture of a known OS exploit and will be used to test if the 
IPDS will detect and respond to the attack.  
4.10.3 PCAP3. This file contains a DOS attack on the server and will be used to test how 
the IDPS detects and responds to the attack. 
38 
4.10.4 PCAP4. This file is a capture of an exploit and a DOS attack while there is high 
volume of traffic on the network. This file will be used to verify how the IDPS reacts under 
different situations. 
4.11 Using Tomahawk  
Tomahawk is a command line utility that runs on Linux based operating systems. 
Tomahawk commands can be used to run a basic evaluation on an IDPS. To use Tomahawk just 
type tomahawk on the command prompt followed by any of the flags. A detailed explanation of 
Tomahawk’s every command and flag is detailed in [44]. In our test setup, we used the Medium 
setup described above with the following hardware and software: 
 The attack workstation- IBM Workstation running SUSE Linux 
 A switch that has DHCP and IDPS capabilities 
 The attacked server- An IBM Workstation running SUSE Linux 
 Four network cables 
 The attack workstation and the attacked server were connected through the switch/IDPS. 
Care was taken to make sure that all the traffic from the attack workstation to the attacked 
server passed through the IDPS.  
The first test involved the PCAP1 been replayed against the attacked server. The following 
Tomahawk commands were used for testing: 
tomahawk -l 2 -f pcap1.pcap  
This command replayed the pcap1 file twice and produced the following output:  
Beginning test 
Completed 1 loop of trace pcap1.pcap 
Completed 1 loop of trace pcap1.pcap 
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Finished 2 loops of trace pcap1.pcap Completed: 2, Timed out: 0 Retrans: 0 Sent: 1686 Recv: 
1686 
This output shows that the both replays finished without being blocked. If the pcap1 file was 
blocked/dropped by the IDPS then the loop will have not completed.  
tomahawk –l 2 –f pcap2.pcap 
The above command replayed PCAP2 file which contained a known exploit against the server. 
The IDPS blocked this attack and the packets were dropped. As a result the loops did not 
complete.  
tomahawk –l 2 –f pcap3.pcap 
The above command replayed PCAP3 file which contained a DOS attack against the server. The 
IDPS blocked this attack and the packets were dropped. As a result the loops did not complete. 
tomahawk –l 2 –f pcap4.pcap 
The above command replayed PCAP4 file which contained an exploit and a DOS attack while 
there is high volume of traffic on the network. These replay packets were dropped by the IDPS 











Experimental Analysis of IDPS Products  
5.1 Selecting IDPS Products:  
For the test environment we selected four IDPS products; two that are open source and 
software based and two that are proprietary and appliance based. After researching Internet, we 
found the plethora of IDPS products; both open source, as well as commercial. We provide a 
partial list of these products in table 2.1. This table is current as on 05/21/2012. This list is 
dynamic due to products being bought by other companies and in the case open source products, 
customer support becomes unavailable or the product does not keep up with new developments 
and competing products which lead users to abandon the product and flock to newer products or 
products with better support. The main driving factors for selecting these products were maturity 
and availability. The section below lists other reasons for choosing these IDPS products. These 
four products were also evaluated based on the parameters presented in table 1 in chapter 2. 
5.1.1 Snort (IDPS 1). Snort was chosen due to its maturity, scalability, cost, and market 
share. Snort is an open source based IDPS product that is available to the public free of charge 
and can be downloaded it from Snort’s website Snort [48]. Snort has been around for more than 
fourteen years and it is the leading IDPS and is used as a base for a number of other open source 
and commercial IDPS [48]. Snort has a large community of users that offer support through 
forums and it also gets development and upkeep support from Sourcefire. Sourcefire is a 
company that sells a commercial version of Snort and provides commercial support for a fee 
[49]. Snort is easy to install and it is not resource intensive and can be installed on any current 
computer system that has a Linux based operating system. Snort can also be installed on a 
Windows based operating system [50]. We also selected Snort due to its support of multiple 
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detection methodologies and its ability to read and examine a PCAP file as if it was monitoring 
the packets off the network [48]. This offers other evaluating opportunities that are not available 
in other IPDS products. 
5.1.2 OSSEC (IDPS 2). OSSEC is another open source based IDPS product that we 
selected and used in our test environment. OSSEC was select based on how it works, it is mainly 
an anomaly based product that works by checking log analysis, inspecting and maintaining file 
integrity, policy monitoring, and rootkit detection [51]. This allows OSSEC to offer a more 
accurate product although it can produce a high volume of alerts depending on how it is tuned. 
OSSEC supports all of the current operating systems and it has a very small foot print which 
allows it to run on any hardware. It is simple to install and configure and is highly scalable by 
design. OSSEC can run as a standalone IDPS protecting a single machine or as centralized 
protecting multiple machines with different operating systems [51]. OSSEC was acquired by 
Trend Micro a commercial maker of computer security products and have promised to continue 
the OSSEC project but added commercial support and development to it. OSSEC was also 
selected for other possible uses in future work due to its varied uses. 
5.1.3 Proprietary 1 (IDPS 3). IDPS 3 is one of the commercial proprietary IDPS 
products that we had access to use in our test environment on condition we do not disclose its 
identity during our evaluations. It is for this reason that we decided to refer to all the IDPS 
products in our environment as IDPS and a number. The first proprietary product, IDPS 3 is an 
appliance based product that is very easy to install and use. It is a plug and play IDPS product. 
IDPS 3 offer a management console accessed through a web browser that offers advanced 
configuration and customizations. Although the console is simple to use, an advanced 
networking security skill is required in order to correctly customize the product. One of the                                                 
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 drawbacks of this product was that it was an entry-level product. 
5.1.4 Proprietary 2 (IDPS 4). IDPS 4 is the second commercial proprietary IDPS 
products that we had access to use in our test environment on condition we do not disclose its 
identity during our evaluations. Unlike IPDS 3, IDPS 4 is a high end commercial IDPS that uses 
hybrid detection methodologies and is only available as an appliance. IDPS 4 comes with paid 
support that   allows you to get updates and signatures. This is a very expensive product to 
purchase and support. IDPS 4 comes with help on initial installation, configuration and 
customization. IDPS 4 can be easy to use since it can be configured to automatically receive 
signatures and has a roll back feature. IDPS 4 has a number of options that come at additional 
cost. The major option is the ability to inspect encrypted packets but this places significant 
overhead on the product. 
5.2 Setting up Testing Environment 
We conducted all our tests using the advanced setup, described in section-4. The other setups 
outlined in section 4 were not adequate for our needs and that is why they were not chosen. The 
advanced setup in section 4 was used as a guide for creating a more involved advanced setup that 
is representative of a production environment with diverse hardware and software as shown in 
Figure 3.1 and Table 2.2. In our test environment setup, we expanded the advanced setup so that 
we will be able to try out different configurations without making major configuration changes. 
For example, we could send identical attacks to four workstations that are behind different IDPS 
products without making configuration changes. This is possible due to the high number of 
available workstations and it allows us to also observe and compare the performance of the 
workstations, network, and IPDS products while under attack. We stayed away from using 
virtual machines as they complicate performance calculations due to the sharing of resources. It 
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could be easy to confuse overhead from the attacks and overhead created by the host as it tries to 
manage the demand by the virtual machines as they become under attack 
Table 2.1 
Sample IDPS products  
 
Product Name 






Tipping Point A 




Sourcefire NGIPS S 
AirDefense Both 
Airtight S 
NitroGaurd IPS A 















SUSE Linux Wireshark Backtrack 
3 Dell Servers Windows 2008 R2 Tomahawk LOIC 




2 Cisco 48 port 
switches 
 Internet Access  
4 ThinkPad laptops  IDPS 1  
2 Dell Latitude 
laptops 
 IDPS 2  
IDPS 3    
IDPS 4    
 
Using the above hardware and software we built a test environment shown in Figure 3.1. The 
internet, firewall and the router where only used during the setup phase of the test lab. During 
this phase only a Windows 7 laptop was connected and this laptop was used to download all the 
required software. Once all the required software was downloaded the router and the Windows 7 
laptop were disconnected from the switch. This was done as a way to control the network traffic 
that will be present on the test environment network during our evaluations. Running the 
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experiments while connected to the internet could produce unreliable results since the traffic 
patterns would vary between experiments. As a result we setup our lab, performed, and captured 
the attacks to be used with the experiments without the internet. This assures that our attacks do 
not contain other traffic or attacks from the internet that we are not aware of. The Internet 
connection can be connected back during the test phase so that it can be used for background 
traffic and producing a realistic test environment if the production environment where the IDPS 
will reside is connected to the internet.  
Our test lab separated the network switches and placed the IDPS between the switches. 
Switch 1 provides connectivity to the internet, management laptop, attack machines, and the 
server that hosts Tomahawk. On the other hand we have Switch 2 and it provides connectivity to 
all the machines on the attacked side. Between Switch 1 and Switch 2 are the IDPS products that 
link the two switches. We placed the IDPS between the two switches so that all the traffic 
between the attack and attacked machines go through the IDPS.  
We evaluated four different IDPS products, two software based and two that are hardware 
based. These products have been described in the preceding section.  
 5.2.1 Hardware setup. The hardware, software, and tools used in our test lab are listed 
above in Table 2.2 and preceding section went over the general setup of out lab. In this section 
we describe Figure 3.1 which is how the hardware in the test environment is laid out. The IDPS 
products divide the network and only one IDPS is shown in Figure 3.1 for simplicity reasons. 
The lab has four IDPS products, three that are placed were IDPS is shown in Figure 3.1 and one 
that is place on the attacked workstation.  
5.2.2 Tools. We separated and grouped the tools used in our test environment as shown in 
Table 2.2 and a brief discussion of some of them is given below.  
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5.2.2.1 WhatsUPGold. WhatsUPGold is commercial available monitoring tools that we 
used to monitor the performance of the computers and the network [52]. This tool was used to 
create base lines and these baselines were used to evaluate performance during the analysis 
phase. We used an evaluation edition of this product. 
5.2.2.2 Backtrack 5. Backtrack is an all in one network security tool that is mainly used 
to test how secure networks are [53]. We used the tool to launch attacks that we then captured 
using Wireshark and saved as PCAP files. These PCAP files were then used with Tomahawk to 
evaluate the IDPS products in our test environment.  
5.2.2.3 LOIC and Jolt2. These are related tools that we used to launch denial of service 
attacks. LOIC launches the standard DOS attack while Jolt2 launches a DOS attack that uses 
fragmentation [54].   
5.2.3 Attacks. Four attacks were used in our evaluations and these attacks are more 
involved than the attacks covered in chapter 3. We used the following attacks: 
5.2.3.1 Denial of service (Attack 1). It is a basic denial of service attack against a 
Windows server. 
5.2.3.2 Complex attacks (Attack 2). In complex attacks we used a combination of attacks 
and used a distributed denial of service attack to other machines on the network and also reduced 
the network throughput to speed up the effects of the attacks. 
5.2.3.3 Fragmentation (Attack 3). Fragmentation is an attack that takes advantage of the 
normal network process which allows packets to be broken up and transmitted in bits that are out 
of order.  
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5.2.3.4 Evasion (Attack 4).  In this attack, an encrypted payload was pushed and 
delivered to the protected server and once there it was used to attack other servers and 
workstations on the network. 
5.3 Experimental Results 
This section describes the results of analyzing the four IDPS products based on the 





















Figure 3.1. Our Test Environment. 
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5.3.1 Evaluating resistance to evasion. There are a number of ways to evade an IDPS and this 
number changes as new ways and solutions to old ones are discovered. We choose to evaluate 
the four IDPS products we have in our test environment using four of the most common 
techniques. These techniques are denial of service, complex attacks, fragmentation, and evasion.  
During the denial of service attack the hardware based IDPS did better than the software 
ones.   Denial of Service is an attack that is designed to cause the targeted system to waste its 
resources on a diversion caused by the attack thereby eliminating available resources to 
legitimate system uses/users.   Software based IDPS products require an operating system to host 
them. Depending on the operating system used, an attacker can easy attack the host operating 
system and disable the IDPS. These are attacks can be as simple as getting the host machine to 
process other tasks that are resource intensive which limits the resources that are available to the 
IDPS.  In our test we launched Windows 7 exploit using Backtrack and we were able to 
overwhelm the host that hosed IDPS 2. Once the host was starved of resources, the IDPS failed 
to stop the subsequent attacks.  The appliance based IDPS has a much smaller attack surface 
since their operating system a custom configured for one task and have all unnecessary services 
disabled. This gives the appliance based IDPS an advantage over a software IDPS and if the host 
operating system is Windows based, it fairly easy for the attacker to disable it. IDPS 1 is a little 
secure compared to IDPS 2 due to its host operating system. UNIX based operating systems are 
more secure that Windows ones. When we configured IDPS 1 on a Windows host, we were able 
to get more successful attacks through by first attacking the host. We were able to attack the 
Unix based host but those attacks required more resources than the Windows ones. The windows 
hosted IDPS 2 was the only one the managed to spot the evasion attack we launched.  In this 
attack, an encrypted payload was successfully delivered to the protected server and once there it 
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was used to attack other servers and workstations behind the IDPS. IDPS 1, IDPS3, and IDPS4 
did not stop the evasion attack since it was encrypted. IDPS 2 allowed the attack to go through 
but alerted when the encrypted payload was unencrypted and tried to compromise the host. 
IDPS3 and IDPS 4 have optional modules that can detect and inspect encrypted traffic, but these 
come at a significant cost. The modules also affect performance as the IDPS spends more 
resources decrypting and re-encrypting the network traffic as it travels through it. 
In complex attacks we used a combination of attacks and used a distributed denial of 
service attack to other machines on the network. We reduced the network speed to 10MBS. 
Under these conditions it did not take long for systems to fail. This was designed to place a more 
work load on the IDPS. IDPS 1 did not perform well under these attacks when compared to the 
other three. Once the network was pushed the limit, IDPS 1 became unreliable due to the rate of 
dropped packets.  IDPS 2 performed better than the rest of them in this evaluation, but its results 
need interpretation. IDPS 2 let all the attacks through the machines it was protecting but it 
stopped the attacks from executing.   Fragmentation is an attack that takes advantage of the 
normal network process which allows packets to be broken up and transmitted in bits that are out 
of order. An attacker can take advantage of this by sending packets that are out of order. This 
also places an overhead on the IDPS as it now has to spend more resources processing these 
packets. IDPS 2 performed poor on this attack and it allowed all of these to go through. The 
results of the four evaluations are shown in Figure 3.2.  
5.3.2 High accuracy rate. We measured accuracy by counting the number of attacks an IDPS 
successfully detected and blocked. IDPS 3 had the highest number of stopped attacks while IDPS 
2 and IDPS 4 were tied in the middle with IDPS 1 at the bottom of the list with the lowest 
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number of foiled attacks. IDPS 2’s accuracy rate was misleading and needed to be further 
analyzed. 
 
Figure 3.2. Resistance to evasion. 
 IDPS 2 allowed attacks to get to the protected host but it alerted on all attacks. This is due 
to the way it works, it only alerts after the attack has reached the host it is protecting and then 
tries to blocks the attack. This puts it at a disadvantage when compared to an IDPS that detects 
and blocks attacks on the wire before it gets to the protected host. Once the attack/attacker is on 
the target machine is much harder to block it. The attack/attacker can easily disable the IDPS or 
modify the alerts and logs and in so doing cover their tracks, once they are the target machine. 
The target can also be used as a launching pad for other attacks. IDPS 2 has a very high and 
accurate detection rate over the other IDPS and it can be a best fit in an environment where all 


































Figure 3.3. High accuracy rate. 
 5.3.4 Market share. Market share is the number of installations the IDPS has. A number 
of factors such as price, product/vendor name recognition, marketing, support, product 
effectiveness, and other affect how the IDPS is perceived in the market. We aggregated the 
information from public and private sources and came with Figure 3.4.  Figure 3.4 shows how 
our test IDPS measure against one another in the IDPS market. IDPS 1 is the most installed IDPS 
in the world and it is the base of most commercial IDPSs [Snort]. IDPS 1’s dominance of the 
market is due to the fact that it is free and has a very big community that provides free support. 
IDPS 2 has a very small market share due to how it works which reduces its broad appeal. IDPS 
3 and IDPS 4 share about the same market share. Their market share is negatively affected by 


































Figure 3.4. Market share. 
 5.3.5 Performance and overhead. An IDPS places some overhead on the monitored and 
protected network or computer systems. At minimum the IDPS has to have the same throughput 
as the network it monitors. If it has a lower throughput, it will become a bottleneck on the 
network.  There is also a need to understand the difference between monitoring throughput and 
inspected throughput. It is our finding that there is a bigger gap between advertised IDPS 
monitoring speed and inspected speed. For example IDPS 3 has four ports that support 
10/100/1000MBPS but only offers 50MBPS of inspected throughput. We used an evaluation 
copy of WhatsUPGold, a computer and network monitoring tool to take baseline performances 
of our test lab before, during, and after our evaluations. Using these baselines we came up with 
Figure 3.5 which shows how our test IDPS products performed and affected the test 
environment. We measured performance as a percentage of how long it took the IPDS to detect 
and prevent an attack. We also looked at how the IDPS get its updates and how complete are the 






updates. We found that just looking at the number of available signatures alone can be 
misleading. What is more important is the protecting the signatures offer against all known 
attacks and their variants and their relevance. For example if our environment has only one type 
of computer systems, we would prefer an IDPS that will automatically be aware of this or allow 
us to upload only the signatures for attacks that affect our systems rather than upload every 
signature they have. Uploading every signature leads to a bigger and less responsive detection 
times as the system has to processes the traffic against all the signatures.  The overhead 
percentage was calculated by comparing the baselines of the monitored system. We compared 
how the system performed before and after the IPDS and also compared the baselines gathered 
during the attacks. Under normal operating conditions the overhead produced by the four IDPS 
products in our lab is negligible. Figure xx shows the numbers at pick load. IDPS behaves 
differently at pick performance and these differences need to be clearly understood. We found 
that IDPS 1 drops packets as it approaches its maximum inspected throughput and then fails 
open once it reaches it maximum. While IDPS 4 does not drop packets, instead it stops 
inspecting for predetermined period and then it starts inspecting again. IDPS 3 does not drop 
packets but just fails open and does not try to inspect until there is enough resources. Comparing 
IDPS3 and IDPS 4, it is clearly that IDPS 4 offers better performance. IDPS 1 offered the least 
performance and IDPS 2 is close to IDPS 3.  
Looking at the overhead placed on the monitored system by the IDPS at its peak 
performance produces a better measure of how the system will behave. We measured overhead 
using WhatsUPGold during the complex attacks. During complex attacks we reduced the 
network throughput from 1 GBPS  to 100 MBPS  and placed background traffic on the network. 
This was done to fill up the network and push the IDPS to their maximum inspected throughput. 
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IDPS 2 place the least amount of overhead on the system. IDPS 2 performance here needs to be 
explained. Since IDPS 2 does not take any action when the attacks reach the machine, there was 
change in the performance monitor for the host that hosted IDPS 2 as the network traffic and 
attacks increased but and IDPS 2’s resource use did not significantly spike as did IDPS1.  IDPS 1 
started dropping packets at 70 percent of its limit and placed the most overhead on the system.  
As IDPS 1 was struggling to keep up the load it also placed a significant load on the host that 
hosted it. IDPS 3 and IDPS 4 did not drop packets when the load increased instead they just let 
the packets go through. They both placed a small but noticeable overhead on the system. The 
difference between them was how they handled failures. IDPS 3 just failed open and did not 
inspect traffic until the attacks were over and the load was reduced on the network. IDPS 4 on 
the other hand continued to try and inspect traffic every minute until it could manage the load 
when the attacks started recede. This gave IDPS 4 a performance advantage over the other three 
IDPS products. How the IDPS products performed and the overhead they placed on the  
 
 













































monitored system is shown in Figure 3.5. 
 5.3.6 Maturity level. Maturity level is mainly measured by how long the product has 
been in the market and it is related to market share. We decided to expand our metrics to include 
more than just the years and acceptance. How much the IDPS has kept up with change and 
weather it continues to grow and accessibility were added to our formula. IDPS 1 has a sizable 
lead in this evaluation as portrayed by Figure 3.6. IDPS 1 is one of the earliest and the longest 
running IDPS product in the market and it continues to be used as the base for most commercial 
IDPS products [37]. IDPS 1 is an open source product that is freely available through a 
download to anyone through. IDPS 4 came in second followed by IDPS 3 and IDPS 2 is at the 
bottom of the list. IDPS 3 and IDPS 4 have progressed much better than IDPS 1 and IDPS 2 and 
have developed nice features, but these features come at an additional cost as an upgrade.  
 

































 5.3.7 Easy to use and configure. Ease of use and configuration are subjective and 
dependent on the environment and the skill set of the administrator. For our evaluation we polled 
some users of these IDPS and the compared that information with our experiences and the results 
are shown in Figure 3.7. IDPS 3 and IDPS 4 are appliances that come configured for a specific 
purpose and do not require a lot of skill to get them up and running. IDPS 1 and IDPS 2 are 
software based and require a host operating system to host them. IDPS 2 was much easier to 
install and configure when compared to IDPS 1. The installation on IDPS 1 was the most 
involved and required a number of extra steps before and after the installation on the host 
machine in order to get IDPS 1 working properly. IDPS 1 also required more time and skill to 
keep it updated with the latest signatures.  
 
Figure 3.7. Easy to use and configure 
IDPS 1 also took the most amount of time configuring, tweaking, and applying the signatures.  





























easiest install since all they required was power and there configuration was fairly simple. These 
appliance based IDPS products have a clear lead over the software one when it comes to 
installation and use as shown in Figure 3.7. IDPS 3 has the easiest web user interface that is just 
point and click and it also has a command line interface. IDPS 3 comes with most of its options 
already configured and can work straight out of the box. IDPS 4 takes just a little time to go 
through its options and make sure it is optimal before use. 
 5.3.8 False positives.  False positives are alerts about attacks that are not correct. False 
positives pose no risks as they are results of the IDPS thinking that a non-attack is an attack. 
IDPS 2 produced that highest number of false positives alerts. This is in part due to the way it 
works. IDPS 1 was in second followed by IPDS 3 and IDPS 4 was at the bottom with the least 
number of false positive alerts. Figure 3.8 shows the false positives that we received during the 
evaluations. 
 






























 5.3.9 False negatives. False positives are attacks that are successful and are not detected 
by the IDPS and a result no alerts are generated for them. False negatives are dangerous as they 
give a false sense of security. IDPS 2 had a high number of false negatives, but these numbers 
need to be further examined. Looking at the machines protected by IDPS 1 we discovered that all 
of our attacks made it to the machines but then IDPS1 stopped them or alerted when they tried to 
manipulate the targeted machines. IDPS 2 followed on the list, followed by IDPS 3 and IDPS 4 
was at the bottom of this evaluation with the least number of false negatives. The results of the 
false positive evaluations are shown in Figure 3.9. 
 
 
Figure 3.9. False negatives. 
 5.3.10 Cost and maintenance. We combined cost and maintenance as they are closely 
related. IDPS 1 topped the list on this evaluation since it is free and has no yearly maintenance 
fees that are associated with it. The only cost associated with it is the cost of server to host it. It 
































are a number of open source variants of Linux and in our lab we used SUSE Linux. We chose 
SUSE due to its ease of use and its large number of supported hardware. You could run IDPS 1 
on a Windows based operating system but that will increase the cost and reduce the stability of 
the IDPS. Using Windows will also increase the chance of the IDPS been bypassed since there 
are so many ways to exploit a Windows operating system. IDPS 2 is not free but it is relatively 
cheap and has the same advantages as IDPS 1. IDPS 2 has a small yearly maintenance fee. IDPS 
3 and IDPS 4 are very expensive to both purchase and maintain and they justify the cost by 
offering support, automated signature updates, leading research labs on threats. They also 
promise better detection engines and signatures that are continual been updated. In our 
evaluations these two produced better results and where easier to configure. Figure 3.10 portrays 
how these IDPS products compare to one another on cost. 
 
Figure 3.10. Cost/maintenance. 
One of the cost disadvantages of IDPS 3 and IDPS 4 is that they are not scalable like IDPS 1 and 

























upgrade these appliances is to buy the newer models that are much more expensive. The software 
based IDPS can easily be scaled by adding more resources such as memory, CPU, hard drive 
space, and network cards to the host server. Which is much cheaper and easy to do the getting a 
new appliance. 
 5.3.11 Protection against new attacks. When new attacks surface IDPS vendors quickly 
develops new signatures that detect and block these attacks, but this can take days, weeks, and 
even months. During this time systems protected by these systems will be vulnerable. Some 
IDPS such as IDPS 3 can detect and prevent new attacks without new signatures since they do 
not depend on signatures for detection. To evaluate how the test IDPS handled new attacks, we 
launched a variant of a Windows exploit that we downloaded from the internet. In this evaluation 
only IDPS 2 stopped a new attack and the other IDPS did not. Table 3.1 shows how our test 
IDPSs fared against new attacks. It is worth mentioning that after applying new signatures to 
IDPS 1 and IDPS4, they both detected and stopped the exploit. We could not clearly establish the 
time that lapsed between the exploit’s discovery and the release of the signatures since the 
exploit has been around for a while and that type of work is outside of our focus. IDPS 2 employ 
anomaly based detection and that is why it performed so much better in this evaluation. 
Table 3.1 











Protection Against New 
Attacks 
No Yes No No 
Scales easily 
Yes Yes No No 
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5.3.12 Scalability software based. IDPS products outperformed the appliance based one 
on scalability. IDPS 2 is the most scalable one since it runs on the monitored host and all it takes 
is to install on the new host. Even if it is centralized, to scale it you just add extra resources to the 
monitoring server. IDPS 2 is also easy to expand and grow since it requires no license and runs 
on servers which are fairly cheap and easy to expand as the environment grows. Our appliance 
based products are not as easy to expand and were equal bad on this evaluation. IDPS 4 is a little 
expandable since it has more ports than IDPS 1 but it ran out of processing power before it ran 
out of ports. For the appliance based IDPS the only solution to scale them is to replace them with 
new one which are much more expensive. Some vendors will offer trade-ins but that is not 















Conclusion and Future Work  
This thesis addressed the misunderstandings of IDPS methodologies by explaining the 
four popular IDPS methodologies which are anomaly based, signature based, stateful protocol 
analysis based, and hybrid based detection methodologies. A method for evaluating and 
comparing these methodologies was developed and presented thereby simplifying the evaluation 
of IDPS methodologies and products that use these methodologies. This thesis also presented and 
discussed different ways to setup a test environment for evaluating IDPS products using open 
source tools Tomahawk and Wireshark. During the discussions three setups, the basic, medium, 
and advanced setups were developed. A way to create relevant PCAP files using Wireshark was 
also shown. Creating own PCAP files  solves the lack of current data set problem and reduces the 
risk created by using questionable data sets from the internet. Using own PCAP files improves 
the evaluation results since current and representative network traffic will be used. The final 
phase of this thesis presented the analysis of the experiments that we conducted using the 
evaluation parameters, the setups, and test IDPS products. The experiments were a way to 
evaluate both the IDPS products and our evaluation parameters. The experiments also produced 
new data sets for use in IDPS evaluations.  
This thesis was not focused on developing a new IDPS methodology or improving the 
ones that exit, instead it was focused on three things. The first thing was to identify and define 
four popular IDPS methodologies, second the objective was to offer a simple way to evaluate 
these methodologies, and third goal was to offer a simple way to evaluate and understand IDPS 
products. It is currently very difficult to evaluate and select an IDPS product and we offered a 
solution to this problem through our experiments. The parameters used to evaluate our test IDPS 
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products can be used as a guide to help evaluate and understand what an IDPS offers and also 
validate its claims. For example most popular IDPS products claim to have a very high accuracy 
without explaining what they mean by high accuracy. Using our parameters an IDPS’s accuracy 
rate can be broken down based on performance, overhead, scalability, usability and cost. We 
offered a way to evaluate vendor claims against user needs and we explained that lab results vary 
and based on the environment the experiments were conducted, for example almost all IDPS 
products will offer protection against known attacks and as a result the focus when considering 
an IPDS product is to look at the methodologies it uses and how it offers protection against new 
attacks. The other parameters that have to be understood before selecting an IDPS are cost, 
usability and scalability, most vendors tend to separate these parameters and present them in way 
that does not present the whole picture. This thesis explained how these parameters are 
interdependent, for example it does not matter how high the product is ranked if it is too 
expensive, difficult to use and does not scale well. Our evaluation parameters offers a simple and 
yet effective way to evaluate IDPS methodologies and products. Our setups solved the problem 
presented by lack of publicly available data sets for use in evaluating IDPS products by 
presenting ways one can create own data sets using publicly available tools. Using own data sets 
produces better results and reduces security risks posed by using data sets found on the internet.  
Future work includes fine tuning and explaining our evaluation parameters and making 
them and our setups available to the public. We are looking at setting up a presence on the web 
for running more evaluations of both commercial and open source IDPS products and making 
our results public. The focus will be on evasion techniques, accuracy rates, and validating vendor 
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